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In the wake of poststructuralism and deconstruction, the notion of truth and its 
representation has come in for some hard times in the academic establishment. Due 
to a perception of Nietzsche as having reduced truth to an arbitrary metaphoric order 
imposed by human beings on the chaos of reality, as well as a reading of Saussure 
in which the relation between sign and referent is claimed to be arbitrary, the idea 
of referential truth becomes nothing but the specific efficacies of competing systems 
of discursive power.1 This way of thinking doesn’t recognize its own performative 
contradiction: due to its conclusion of truth as arbitrary, it cannot claim for itself 
a truer depiction of what is than what it hopes to replace. 
Both the analytical and continental traditions of philosophy involve 
engagements with how language represents reality. The major difference is that a 
large part of the continental tradition has more or less made up its mind in favor 
of the thesis I’ve just described, made more semantically fluid and uncertain by 
Derrida and materially imposed upon bodies by Foucault; this is taken as axiomatic 
by anyone working within its theoretical boundaries. Analytical philosophy, from 
Frege and Russell to Wittgenstein to Alfred Tarski and Donald Davidson, does 
not share this axiomatic confidence, and continues to ponder how truth works, 
how reference functions, how we make sense to one another and share meaning.2 
Obviously there is an intimate relation between questions of truth and questions 
of representation, if only in the everyday sense of knowing what to believe when 
we hear, see, or read something, especially if it is information we need to act upon. 
But the question becomes more complex when we deal with literary fictions or 
theatrical performances; at that point the truth we seek or see there is not simply 
a matter of direct reference. And because what we read or see is a form of make-
believe, willingly entered into if understood as theatre, unknowingly if it is a 
confidence game, it elicits a level of concern about trusting or mistrusting what 
we are expected to accept as true in a general sense.3 
In theories of the theatre, mimesis or imitation has always been a vexed issue 
because in the past the enemies of theatre confused the self-conscious use of mimetic 
illusion or make-believe with lying about reality (hence Sidney’s response about 
the poet never affirming, therefore never lying). But within the world of the play, 
theatre artists themselves have shown how easy it is for some to use theatrical means 
to convey a false picture about what is the case–for Shakespeare the words “art” 
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and “seeming” are almost always suspicious signs of pernicious plotting–but also 
understanding that the same means can be used as tricks to reveal the falsehood of 
imposture (e.g., Hamlet and Measure for Measure). In more recent times, Brechtian 
metatheatre has been used as an anti-theatrical weapon against the theatrical illusion 
of naturalism, intending to reveal the uncritical workings of ideology. In a more 
aesthetic light, the anti-theatrical aspect of high modernist theatre is explored by 
Martin Puchner in Stage Fright: “Modernist drama and theater is a Platonist theater, 
by which I mean not a theater of abstract ideas but a theater infused with types of 
anti-theatricality first developed in Plato’s closet dramas.”4 Puchner’s reference to 
Plato’s “closet dramas” gives us a clue as to the real issue: Plato is understood by 
many to be anti-mimetic, but the irony is that his “closet dramas,” his dialogues, 
are themselves mimetic productions, with Socrates as the main character.5 
In this essay I argue that the notion of mimesis does not have to be automatically 
consigned to a Platonic idealism or theory of forms, and that Plato–or Socrates, 
rather–in the Republic is by no means consistently anti-mimetic. It is not simply 
mimesis in itself that troubles Socrates (though he notes its degraded state with 
regard to the ideal) but only particular uses of it, uses that should not trouble us in 
the same way, especially after Aristotle’s revisions. Socrates wavers back and forth 
between wanting to condemn mimesis outright as eminently amenable to abuse 
and at the same time seeing it as inevitable and necessary for the education of his 
guardians. In the end it is not mimesis per se that bothers him, but inappropriate 
uses with regard to his utopian (and decidedly masculinist and stoic) aims. 
Contemporary attempts to undermine mimesis as something substantial and 
pernicious in and of itself go overboard in their theorization of the term; in reality 
such complicated attempts are unnecessary for their specific critical purposes. 
Especially in deconstructionist readings of Plato’s use of the word mimesis, a 
confusion occurs when mimesis is supposed to be understood, since Plato’s time, 
as either inherently truthful or inherently idealist or theological, and as such needs 
to be shown as metaphysical and a form of false consciousness. This mistakes the 
possible truthful or false use of mimesis (which in itself is neutral) for mimesis 
as something true or false in itself. Clearly the representation of truth depends on 
the operation of mimesis, but the operation of mimesis need not be truthful; it can 
advance falsehoods as well, as Socrates knew. 
To begin to show how this problem of confronting the idea of mimesis is read 
as an ineluctably Platonic one, to show how it is supposed to subtend the worst 
features of exclusionary social and political practices in the West and, beyond that, 
to show how the category of truth is also undermined by the apparent subversion 
of this Platonic idea of mimesis, I will examine Elin Diamond’s theory of mimesis 
in her book Unmaking Mimesis. Her model for “unmaking” is the mimétisme of 
Luce Irigaray, a feminist theorist whose mentor and major influence was Jacques 
Derrida. In Diamond’s book, according to her purposes, Platonic mimesis is marked 
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as either essentially phallic and masculinist (“saming”) or essentially feminine, 
understood as fluid, shape-shifting nature, an inherent threat to Plato’s ideal of 
the unity of self. She mistakes both Plato’s criticism of “womanish” behavior by 
suffering male tragic heroes, and Aristotle’s proscriptions against female tragic 
heroes, as demonstrating the essential way in which mimesis makes representations 
of women impossible.6 If that were true, Plato wouldn’t be making this criticism, 
nor would Aristotle be proscribing female heroes, as she puts it. As Halliwell’s 
translation of the Poetics, Chapter 15, says, “For it is possible to have a woman 
manly in character, but it is not appropriate for a woman to be so manly and clever.”7 
Despite Aristotle, Sophocles’s Antigone and Euripides’s Medea speak against that 
proscription.8 Yet it is true that Irigaray claims that for a woman to speak in a male 
society “a direct feminine challenge to this condition means demanding to speak 
as a (masculine) ‘subject,’ that is, it means to postulate a relation to the intelligible 
that would maintain sexual indifference.”9 This is both a gloss of Aristotle’s “manly 
in character,” and the way in which both Medea and Antigone are described by 
their anxious male counterparts once they enter the argumentative space of the 
polis. For Irigaray, mimétisme, or mimicry (its English translation), is marked by 
the attempt by women to mimic the feminine as defined by masculine perception 
in order not just to play with the image, but to show themselves as playing with it 
to indicate their own agency “elsewhere,” undefined by patriarchy. Her concern is 
that the feminine remain, with whatever attendant pleasure is derived from it by the 
female mimic, while also evading the proscription that necessarily codes all speech 
as masculine. But this assumes that mimesis must be coded as masculine, instead 
of seeing it as a neutral process by which certain hegemonic cultural practices or 
uses of it deem it necessary to regulate its defining terms. If women speak up, they 
are decried as being “male,” if tragic male heroes demonstrate emotional distress, 
they are labeled “womanish” (by Plato, in any case). Luckily there are numerous 
instances of theatrical mimesis over the centuries that have ignored these defining 
prescriptions. While these two characterizations reflect the sexism of a given 
society (and there are quite a few), neither designation is an essential feature of 
the operation of mimesis itself. At a certain point Diamond claims that mimesis is 
“impossibly double,” in order to indicate that it is both “masculine” in the sense of 
unified, coherent, and universal, and “feminine” as shifting, multiple, “a destroyer 
of forms”; the former is seen as “mimesis” proper and the latter as the “mimicry” 
within it that threatens its coherence and power.10 What this does, however, is 
simply reify, at a more abstract level, the implacability of essential differences 
between masculine and feminine attributes as tied to male and female gender, and 
by attributing the latter–the feminine as mimicry–to women, reduces their agency 
to forms of negation, however playful and personally enjoyable. I would claim that 
mimesis and mimicry are practiced in various ways by both men and women, that 
they are both essentially neutral forms of representation, and the doubleness that 
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Diamond sees in them is the confusion of mimesis itself with its ideological uses. 
Hers is an unnecessary and overly abstract theorization of effects that is unlikely 
to work exactly as intended or even understood by the uninitiated, and perhaps not 
even by those who are in on the theory. Theory wants to maintain the purity of the 
intent even if it cannot control the interpretation of the effect. 
Diamond’s idea is to reduce mimesis to the process of “saming”: “mimesis 
patterns difference into sameness.” She takes it further: “Let’s look at a recent 
damning definition: ‘Mimesis . . . posits a truthful relation between world and 
word, model and copy, nature and image[.] . . . referent and sign in which potential 
difference is subsumed by sameness.”11 This is hardly the position of Plato, since 
one of his main concerns about Homer’s use of mimesis is the telling of lies about 
the gods: he recognizes how mimesis can be used to spread falsehood (Republic 
Book II). In the course of her book she tries to “unmake” or “ruin” this ideal 
notion of “saming” through the use of Irigaray’s mimétisme.12 She links Irigaray’s 
technique with Brecht’s estrangement, assuming that mimesis as it typically operates 
as saming is the the same thing as what she calls realism, and that mimétisme and 
estrangement undermine realism as such. In this way her avowed Brechtianism 
makes her unreasonably conflate realism and naturalism, not recognizing that Brecht 
considered himself a realist in opposition to naturalism. His realism depends upon 
points of reference with regard to the nature of actual oppression in the world, or 
his didactic drama would make no sense. Such a use of “realism” as a stalking 
horse is a tendentious tendency all too common in defenders of a purist political 
avant-garde.13 
Diamond reduces all approaches to mimesis to her version of a Platonic 
model. While at various moments she is careful to note the distinctions between 
Aristotle and Plato for general purposes, she ignores that important difference and 
calls the whole thing “the classical model” of mimesis, thus aligning herself with 
a monolithic notion as presented by Irigaray and Derrida. As Stephen Halliwell 
has noted in his important book, The Aesthetics of Mimesis: 
Failure to do justice to this dialectic [Platonic v. Aristotelian 
approaches] is the main weakness in Jacques Derrida’s approach 
to the history of mimesis, an approach that construes that history 
as governed by a necessary commitment to the value of truth and 
which is almost entirely silent about the significance of Aristotle’s 
non-Platonic understanding as a whole, but theories of mimesis 
are not, and need not be, tied to a uniform, let alone a uniformly 
Platonist, metaphysics. 
 He continues,
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Moreover, Derrida’s critique of mimeticism is vulnerable to 
an objection that has been brought against his thinking more 
generally by Hilary Putnam, namely that it identifies a “Platonist” 
model of representation, which seems to require unsustainable 
conditions of philosophical truth, with representation tout court, 
and counts the difficulties of the former [representation] as 
grounds of challenging the validity of any concept of the latter 
[truth].14
The attempted negation of the question of truth in representation because it 
is identified with Platonism becomes especially problematic for any theory, like 
Diamond’s own, that purports to convince us, or politically convict us, regarding 
the effects and possibilities of historical events and acts. But a theory of mimicry 
or mimétisme must itself be conventionally mimetic—that is, not succumb to the 
very ironic destabilizing effect it seeks to describe—without falling into an infinite 
regress or incoherence. All philosophy concerned with the adequate functioning of 
representation–adequate to our needs and to understanding conditions that both form 
and resist our needs, or put another way, concerned with the value of truth–cannot 
be reduced to Platonism tout court. Mimesis is not one perfectly defined monolithic 
Western idea, and human beings who feel themselves oppressed by hegemonic 
representations are not reduced to the mere choice between Platonic idealism and 
a subversive mimicry of it. And yet when writing about the theatre, there is a grain 
of truth in the idea that the mimetic model cannot help but partake of a kind of ideal 
imagining that seems Platonic, and that is an inevitable result of poiesis, the art of 
making that Aristotle links to the mimesis of theatre, even if Aristotle’s thinking 
is disencumbered of worries about proper correspondence with ideal forms.15 It 
is understood from the outset that while the theatre may evoke aspects of the real 
world, it is not that world, nor is it the perfect corresponding representation of 
that world. Theatre’s very form–inevitably self-conscious as illusion, despite any 
suspension of disbelief for the sake of emotional engagement–cannot help but 
present an “ideal” image.16 This is the difference that seems Platonic and yet is not 
Platonic. By “ideal” I don’t mean a perfect model in a theological or eternal sense, 
but rather as a form that has no exact material referent. The theatre, no matter how 
embodied, appears idealist in its form and seems to render everything it (re)presents 
as ideal, if only in the sense that it is removed from reality. This goes for the most 
studied docudrama as well. As Brecht says, without solving the problem, theatre 
“theatres it all down.”17 On the other hand, the hyper-reflexivity of a Brechtian 
theatricalism has the tendency to “theatre it all up.” The latter tendency is not 
necessarily a sufficient answer or solution to the former. 
If we consider the difference between Plato’s ideal forms and Max Weber’s 
“ideal types,” we might be able to approach mimesis in the theatre a little differently. 
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That is, in the first chapter of Economy and Society, Weber makes the important point 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to define things in categories—and therefore 
effectively put to use such categories for our decisions—without assigning them a 
clear, delimited, and consistent identity across a variety of contexts. And we do this 
while knowing they do not match up perfectly with our expectations of them, and 
alter with circumstances as well.18 But, as in any science, the measure of something’s 
truth-value is the measure of its predictability as it helps us define it as an ideal 
type. This pragmatic conception of the use of types is much closer to an empirically 
minded Aristotle, who referred to “kinds” of characters and actions, than to an 
idealist Plato. Thus, for instance, in the Poetics Aristotle counters Plato’s negation 
of mimesis, as distorting the ideal truth of a thing’s or person’s self-same identity, 
with a conception of plausibility that relates to a kind of common social experience: 
types and kinds of human character and behavior that we already recognize within 
our social existence. The aesthetic and ethical criteria Aristotle sets up for both 
spectator response to character and action in the Poetics are, basically, ideal types 
in the Weberian sense for producing what he considers to be the most effective 
drama. There “representation” meets “production” halfway–which indicates one 
does not simply displace the other. Aristotle indicates that in drama there is no 
mimesis without poiesis, that is, an act that is creative, a making.19 Aristotle’s 
distinction between history and poetry attempts to clarify the mimetic problem 
insofar as history is supposed to reveal what is, poetry what could be (although it 
is obvious to us today that history involves a rhetorical “making” as well). Further, 
the fact that dramatic mimesis is made–partakes of poiesis–already indicates 
its artifactuality, not its pretension to being a simple mirror of reality. As noted 
elsewhere by Aristotle, art (techne) doesn’t mirror nature, it “completes” it. The 
poet does not simply copy but creates through using resemblances of what is, i.e., 
is familiar or understandable. But this creation is at the same time an interpretation, 
as Gadamer would have it, or as he puts it in Truth and Method, a “highlighting.”20 
Performance in the theatre, no matter how embodied, is still transcendent, if 
only through the slippages and diverse possibilities of signification and meaning 
and the variable nature of attention and focus. In this I may seem to be affirming a 
kind of deconstructive metaphysics, but I recognize the theatrical, in its production 
of a possible (other) world, for what it tends to manifest itself as—a linguistic (or 
semiotic) idealism. It is this which prevents a truly “materialist” theatre from ever 
being possible. Even ruthlessly self-deconstructing theatres, such as the Wooster 
Group, develop an aura around the nature of their deconstructions. The “real” 
standpoint from which they undermine their own processes becomes idealized 
as the fulcrum of all attention paid to the nature of attention. None of what I say 
here is negated by the material, kinesthetic experience of theatre as a present and 
physical medium. That indeed is the stratum it is built upon, but it is also never 
simply that. Theatre’s transcendence is encountered within this very experience 
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that draws us out of our habitual mindsets and moves us emotionally through the 
meanings evoked by the language of its speech, gestures, images, and forms. 
Years ago I discovered in the process of playing with my baby daughter, that is, 
when I made the faces she was making back at her, or when I made sounds that she 
made back again to me, that I sometimes encountered a problem of interpretation. 
That is, I believed that I was engaging in simple mimesis, mimicking her sounds, so 
that it would encourage her to make more, and it would seem as if we are actually 
engaged in a kind of conversation. But I also noticed that at certain points, I felt 
as if she might be experiencing my mimicry as mockery, and was not always clear 
when it appeared to her I had crossed a line. It was most clear, obviously, when 
she was making angry or upset sounds—mimicking them would incite her even 
more (thus taking it as mockery). But even when she was making happy sounds, 
the insistence with which I made those sounds back to her, especially if it seemed 
to swamp her own efforts, was perhaps taken as something aggressive. Where and 
when and how does one draw the line between simple mimicry and mockery? What 
is it in the context of reception that causes this to happen? If this is the case, there 
can be no perfect intentional control over this interpretation. 
The transition from mimicry to mockery as I encountered it with my daughter 
seems marked by a sudden disconnect, a shift from an apparent action with to an 
apparent action toward her, an awareness of a forceful use of an expression instead 
of an immediate experience of the expression itself. Obviously a child this age 
would not make this use-content distinction at the sophisticated level an older child 
would. Nonetheless a cognizance of a kind of force behind the expression becomes 
known and is a matter of alienation and concern for her. This happened despite any 
intention on my part to use mimicry as an alienating force. 
Does this also portend a transition to the “fictive,” a metatheatrical marking? 
We do, after all, understand mockery to be a highly self-referential form of mimesis, 
practically seeing the quote marks around its expressions. Scare quotes indeed: 
that mark off, through an exaggerated foregrounding of the particular that suddenly 
becomes a disconnected abstraction, an aggressive use that is at the same time a 
disavowal of, or rejection of concern for, its possible truth-value. (At an older 
age children frequently engage in the annoying game of repeating back to other 
children everything they say, just to watch them react in frustration.) The strategy 
aggressively turns the sincere expression of the other into an empty and impotent 
mask. But oddly enough it is precisely the use of such mockery, or perhaps overuse, 
that can also uncover the emptiness and impotence of the mocker, the lack of any 
other discursive means to resist or make one’s case. This is the case, whether found 
in more naïve forms of resistant performance or in theoretical writing. The more 
scare quotes one finds in an article, for instance, the less likely one is to find an 
actual argument adequate to its purported critical aims. The article may be only 
preaching to the choir, as opposed to an attempt to convince others not already in 
28                                                               Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism
the writer’s circle. 
My point is that the fictive element in this transition from shared mimicry 
to (a sense of) an imposed mockery can bring with it a realization of rhetorical 
means revealing certain intentions not recognized before this point. Does this 
mean that rhetoric connotes fiction (in other words, don’t take me at my word)? 
Here we have to be on our guard, because we might then think that any means by 
which we communicate a truth is “in itself” not truthful and hence likely to vitiate 
the truth it is supposed to convey. Hayden White contends that fiction and history 
are one in this sense–the rhetorical means for the articulation of each are exactly 
the same. And there is much to commend in this position. But if meaning is use, 
according to Wittgenstein (and the recognition of the distinction between mimicry 
and mockery is precisely this), then a distinction should arise between means and 
meaning. For use is not means alone, but the intention and its framework, which 
motivates particular means in a particular direction, which we then argue as the 
truth of a situation. 
When Diamond eventually claims that there is a truth to be conveyed in 
performance, it is essentially the contingency of one’s historical position.21 One’s 
historical truth is always already interpreted from one’s own historical position, 
which is highly unstable and requires an assertion of one’s own self-production 
of identity as a basis. This gives rise to the historicist paradox in which the truth 
of any other historical moment is contingent on one’s interpretation arising from 
one’s own historical moment, which is also contingent, and the flow of temporality 
continually challenges that truth. It’s like trying to shoot from one moving train 
at a target on another. So with all this contingency moving around–another name 
for chance or circumstance–whatever truth there may be is largely indeterminate, 
and one claim could be as good as another. If that’s the case, the very notion of 
truth becomes suspect. What’s more, we can wonder to what degree theatre can 
ever really function as a conveyer of historical knowledge, which is a requirement 
for understanding how history works in the first place. Indeed there is some truth 
to this as a perpetual problem for theatre, perhaps more than for written narrative. 
Does Brecht’s idea that the audience will see itself historically by seeing the events 
on stage historically ever really work? Or does it simply flatter our (or his) more 
perspicuous historical position, while assuming that our critical recognition of the 
falsehoods of past social belief is going to automatically lead to understanding 
the falsehoods of our own?22 But then again, the problem of confirming historical 
truth and falsehood seems of little interest to Diamond. For her, historicization is 
supposed to succeed in unmasking the uncertainty and implausibility at the heart 
of the patriarchal mimetic model of truth without proclaiming its own truth (at best 
maybe its own desire). Diamond characterizes the situation this way: “Brechtian 
historicization assumes and promotes both unofficial histories and unofficial 
historians . . . a move that produces not ‘truth,’ but mastery and pleasure.”23 Am 
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I alone in finding this truthless “mastery and pleasure” politically disconcerting? 
There are implicit truth-models involved in any interpretation or reception 
of theatre. This is true even with those theories influenced by poststructuralism 
that are anti-mimetic or claim that truth is merely an effect of structures of power, 
that it is “made” and not discovered; this is the “performative,” as opposed to the 
“theatrical,” view. In this case the presumption of truth beyond mere making is 
found in the claim that truth is merely “made.” This fundamentally romantic model 
is that of a demiurge—itself Neo-Platonic—whether attributed to human beings or 
their institutions. There is a prevalent idea that theatre works from no models, and 
that it creates its own models. But this is erroneous: it works not from ideal forms, 
but from living types, as Aristotle knew. Even if it didn’t, no actor would be able 
to perform a completely unrecognizable figure, nor would any audience member 
have the possibility of even recognizing it, much less identify with it. Degrees of 
abstraction from possible models, however recombinant they may be, should not 
lead us to assume they are only products of the stage sui generis or ex nihilo. 
The problem with the poststructuralist critique of mimesis is the typical 
deconstructive projection of an all-or-nothing definition onto what it is purporting 
to critique, even when the authors who are the objects of the critique never claim 
such. Mimesis thus is said to reduce all difference to sameness, to perfect identity. 
No one has ever made such a claim, not even Plato. In Book 10 of The Republic, 
we recall, Socrates’s remark about the painter’s rendition of the bed shows it falls 
short of the reality of the ideal bed, much less the constructed bed, and always will. 
That for Plato is one of the problems with mimesis: it is not, nor can be, faithful to 
the ideal original—not that it renders reality so perfectly that we are confused by 
it. For example, one might counter this by saying that the other problem for Plato 
is that of the spectator mimicking what become models of behavior seen on stage 
through confusing artifice with reality. But the assumption of bad habits through 
imitation of bad characters is not necessarily the result of cognitively confusing 
the representation for the reality. This is qualified for adults when Socrates notes 
that children are incapable of understanding what they see or hear “allegorically,”24 
but even the literal need not be confused with the actual. One might realize that an 
act of physical cruelty by an actor is faked, and at the same time be unconsciously 
inspired enough by the context of its intentions to mimic the behavior. What he 
would claim is that the mimetic power that appeals to the baser emotions tends to 
bypass the higher power of reason in the soul. Socrates comments about the skill 
that Homer demonstrates in this facility for inducing pleasure, and it is precisely 
because of this skill–which even he admires–that it is so dangerous. But again, it 
is a particular use of mimesis—whatever the actual validity of Plato’s claims about 
the use may be—not mimesis itself.
Mimesis as the reflection of the ideal becomes in poststructural constructivist 
reasoning simply a reflection of class interest and hegemonic meanings. But its 
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operations in different ideological settings remain the same functionally, even if 
its object is different. Diamond’s use of mimétisme as “mimesis with a difference” 
presupposes that there can be mimesis without a difference, hence the need for 
mimétisme. But, in fact, if one denies the perfect functioning of mimesis as a concept, 
wouldn’t one have to say that all attempts at mimesis result in mimétisme? Not as 
intentional distortion (or should I say interpretive refashioning?) for personal ends, 
but as a continual falling short due to the inevitability of not being able to wholly 
determine one’s ends. Mimétisme becomes the display of pointing to the inevitable 
inability to be fully mimetic as something intentional, or as Judith Butler might 
put it, adventitiously “working the weakness” of the inevitable failure of iterative 
stability in what is articulated. The reverse can be the case too, as when, in Waiting 
for Godot, Pozzo after his oration admits to have faltered at the end, while Gogo 
thought it was “intentional.” The same issue may exist with regard to the apparent 
intentionality of what is called “strategic essentialism.” 
The curious thing about responses to Plato is the way in which deconstructive 
critics who are purportedly anti-Platonic seem to believe in the truth of what he says, 
while being opposed to his attitudes about its value.25 Walter Kaufmann believed 
that Brecht, for instance, was a Platonist.26 This seems highly unlikely since Brecht 
claimed to be a materialist and Plato was an idealist. Yet it is more likely that “the 
enemy of my enemy is my friend.” That is, since Aristotle is Brecht’s enemy and 
Aristotle revised Plato’s views on mimesis and the passions in the theatre, Plato 
is now Brecht’s friend. Aristotle’s view of theatre is a relatively benign one. His 
ideas about catharsis seem to answer Plato’s concern about the arousal of irrational 
emotion in a rational Republic and the mimetic subversions of models of the good 
by presenting models of vice. Brecht, in wanting to see theatre as a revolutionary 
force, has to find a way of overcoming Aristotle’s sanguine theory of “repressive 
desublimation,” to borrow from Marcuse,27 and finds an ally in the disruptive view 
of theatre of Plato. Brecht’s subversive nature delights in what Plato feared, but in 
the process he affirms the supposed truth of Plato’s view. One often finds theatre 
scholars actively seeking out anti-theatricalism in others as a way of proving just 
how potent and anxiety-producing theatre is, when in fact it is unlikely that theatre 
today has much potential for such. The repeated assertions that J. L. Austin is “anti-
theatrical” because of what he said about the lack of the appropriate social or legal 
conditions for the felicity of certain speech acts like marriage vows on stage is a 
telling and overwrought case in point.28
In like manner, Diamond, influenced by deconstruction, opposes Plato because 
of the assumption that his notion of mimesis corresponds to an ideal or divine 
model of truth, which to her mind promotes the conception of an eternal fixity of 
nature. Given the patriarchal context, this means that women will never be able 
to alter their condition as long as that mimetic model is fixed. And so it must be 
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subverted. But is she, and the artists she represents, subverting that model of mimesis 
(mimesis “itself”), or do they believe they are in specific instances subverting the 
particular applications of that model of mimesis? Diamond seems to take Plato at 
his word about the relation of mimesis to ideal forms, instead of simply saying: 
his notion of mimesis is wrong, it is not like that at all. If she thought his notion 
of mimesis didn’t work, there would be no point in trying to subvert it. She thus 
seems to believe in his notion of how mimesis works, even if she doesn’t like how it 
works. But in fact Aristotle messes that up. His idea that mimesis is also articulated 
through an individual creative mode called poiesis—that it is never just replication 
of a pre-existing ideal but something made by an individual with an individual’s 
vision—already articulates the inevitable difference that always already inhabits 
mimesis. There is no “saming.” Perhaps mimétisme is just another version and use 
of Aristotelian mimesis-plus-poeisis without knowing it. 
What’s more, even though Diamond at one point refers to Homi Bhabha, 
Bhabha also undermines the “saming” thesis that animates racist colonialist 
discourse as much as it does sexist discourse. For him, the imposed mimesis on 
the colonized in India by the British is not a question of “saming,” of turning the 
colonized into clones of proper Englishmen (nor certainly the opposite: reading 
them as savage “others” merely), but of rendering them the “same but not quite,” 
so as to justify their ongoing colonization as a “civilizing” mission. (But even 
here the problem is assuming that difference is simply an issue of intention rather 
than inevitable result).29 Seen from the opposite perspective, those who fear the 
globalization of American culture as homogenizing—that is, turning everyone into 
American clones—can’t see the difference that inevitably comes from the creative 
(poiesis) “indigenizing” effects in the mimesis of Western models, which in fact 
rebound back upon the Western model and alter it as well.30 One could take this 
farther and ask what in this process remains essentially “Western.” There is no 
simple either/or way of conceiving of mimetic processes. 
When we consider the nature of the theatre, and the appreciation one brings to 
it in admiring the effects of actors on our consciousness and emotions, it is because 
we accept, as it were, two realities at once (or almost at once)—and the quality of 
their interaction to evoke truths that we find compelling if not necessary. That is, 
one reality is that of the actor and her skill; the second reality is the drama itself, 
which the actor through her skill brings to life; and out of the most skilled and 
fortuitous interactions of these realities arise truth and meaning about our condition 
as we perceive it as being or could be. It is not necessary, as is often thought, for 
the actor’s reality to disappear entirely into that of the drama for the performance 
to have this effect on us. Our admiration for the actor then would cease, and our 
understanding of any truth we might receive would be distorted in its partiality. 
Our admiration for the actor’s skill in bringing the fictional reality to life will not 
necessarily dispel any larger (psychological, political) truth that is conveyed by 
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the performance. Yet the question remains whether one can actually hold both 
realities—the theatrical and dramatic—in one’s mind at the same time, or if it is 
not an effect of switching, as is the case when we view a figure/ground conundrum 
(duck/rabbit, two profiles/one vase). We are caught up in the imaginary of the drama 
and momentarily forget the theatre, even as we are brought back to the theatrical 
level in the appreciation of the skill of the actor.31
All of this seems limited to the theatre. But is it? When we read theories of 
social construction, we are continually encountering the formation of one half of 
a binary that wishes to overcome its complementary other while never escaping it 
entirely. I am thinking of the endless social construction/essentialism antagonism. 
The terms as we encounter them in deconstructive theatrical theories could then 
be implicitly equated as: theatricality = constructionism, drama = essentialism. 
In other words, we read it in the terms of antirealist avant-garde apologists who 
view dramatic realism as the ideological mystagoguery of essentialism. But yet, 
what attempt at a wholly theatrical form of performance is truly possible? Any 
more than a wholly social constructionist view of reality that never for a moment 
slips unconsciously into essentialist thinking? To reverse matters, how do we 
know that the theatrical alienation effect would have any more authority than 
the dramatic situation it is framing? Could one read it in reverse? The dramatic 
situation is framing the gestus, and this is the only way people can make sense of 
the alienating signifier. The attempted elimination of acting or roles appears to many 
as the easiest way of eliminating realism entirely from the scene and instituting 
skeptical theatricalism. And yet can one have theatricality without roles? Such things 
always return in the mystification of the performer himself as skilled—rhetorically, 
physically, dialectically, and so forth. Thus the late Spalding Gray in a highly 
accomplished way mystified in the very act of self-revelation. His “performed 
authenticity” should not be understood with the stress only on the first term, but 
in its conflicted and ambiguous relation to the second, which is just as important. 
And it is this effect of authenticity on the spectator, even as the mechanisms of the 
performance’s creations are being pointed out, that accounts for the ineradicable 
dramatistic or essentialist component. 
In other words, radical social constructionism wants to be the only moment of 
mastery, a kind of omniscient, canny sense that believes it can create without any 
essentialist blindness. But this is impossible, demonstrated by the contradiction 
we see in Nietzsche’s essay “On Truth and Lying in an Extramoral Sense,” where 
he wants to claim that truth is always only an effect created by dead metaphor, but 
that means that his own truth about this truth-making calls into question the actual 
nature of his claim: either an infinite regress or self-contradiction.32 Foucault tried 
to make this point more forcefully through his socialization of the issue as “regimes 
of truth” but was no more successful than Nietzsche in avoiding contradiction. 
Much the same thing can be made of a variation on this “truth-production” theme: 
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the new ideal of the performative. But the performative—however Derrida and 
Butler read Austin—as a form of construction depends upon a taken-for-granted 
“essentialist” belief in a constative structure that upholds and empowers it in the 
first place. To claim that every constative is always already a socially instituted 
performative with no more perspicuous or perduring truth-value than any dependent 
performative itself is to engage in the same kind of infinite regress as Nietzsche’s 
founding of truth in the creation of metaphors.33
While it is easy to imagine that the drama we see unfold as an imaginatively 
believable fiction is entirely dependent upon a theatrical or socially constructed 
basis, it is perhaps less easy to recognize that the self-conscious aspect of theatricality 
itself depends upon an unquestioned basis in a belief in the power of theatricality to 
create this dramatic fiction. In a sense this simply pushes the frame of the psychic 
proscenium but one step back (note what was said above about the Wooster Group). 
Again, this is similar to the problem that, in order to believe Nietzsche’s concept of 
truth-production, one has to put into abeyance Nietzsche’s own truth production and 
accept it as “true” beyond mere “production” on Nietzsche’s part. The suspension 
of disbelief regarding Nietzsche’s performative contradiction that exempts his truth 
claim from mere metaphorical production—his claim about such production is 
true—oddly reflects the very ontological condition of theatre, where it is difficult, 
if not impossible to separate the phenomenological from the ontological.34 It is 
the “essential” nature of construction that is both accepted and forgotten at once. 
What may be most disturbing about mimesis is less when it is gotten wrong 
than when it is gotten right. Either we don’t want to admit the truth of what we’re 
seeing, or else we feel a loss when what we see is the thing we’ve wanted to keep 
private and solely in our possession. If the play is the thing to catch the conscience 
of the king, what is its purpose for the rest of us? When it comes to performance 
with a political intent, for instance, it seems to orient itself to implicate each of 
us within a web of complicity with social forces to which we ought consciously 
to give assent to dissent; it wants to position us for the sake of blame or critical 
empowerment, or both. It seems designed to show us what we are and/or what we 
should be. This requires, at the very least, a process of recognition. But can we 
recognize ourselves in it?
While above I distinguished mimesis from mere mirroring, I want to revisit 
the mirror once more as a metaphor for mimesis, and see if there isn’t a difference 
to be found in the process of mirroring itself. What is it about the mirror that 
can sometimes prove so disconcerting to us at certain moments? When we see 
ourselves age almost overnight? When we wonder if this person is what others are 
seeing? While I admit that there is a problem with seeing mimesis quite simply as 
a “mirror” (Plato’s little joke about the easiest way to represent something, whose 
simplicity as a concept is defeated by Aristotle’s complication by poiesis), there is 
also Hamlet’s more serious take on showing the world (and the king) its own face. 
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Mirrors obviously do not “mimic” anything: they reflect, but for Hamlet to act is to 
imitate the mirror in its power of reflecting social reality as it is. Even Brecht’s aim 
is nothing more than this. But it does not–or cannot–do so directly. Brecht found that 
it worked better for the sake of critical audience reflection to place current social 
conflicts in the contexts of other historical moments, just as for the tragic theatre of 
Athens the cities of Thebes and Corinth conveniently served as Athens’s “evil twins” 
as an indirect means to otherwise painful self-criticism. Jean-Paul Sartre has noted 
that we cannot see ourselves in the mirror as objects—that is, objectively—for we 
are always already seen as accepted images that inure us to any actual recognition, 
especially as to how we appear to others.35 But even Sartre admits that mirrors can 
provide a fleeting shock of objectification at the right moment. It is then that the 
split in representation presents itself, in which the shock of recognition transpires 
precisely because of an almost simultaneous lack of recognition. 
In recent cognitive neuroscience studies, something called “mirror neurons” 
found in the forebrains of monkeys have been hypothesized as having an immediate 
effect in human beings who unconsciously imitate the gestures and attitudes of 
others in their presence.36 In both the theatre and dance worlds this has been referred 
to as “kinesthetic” response. The unreflective immediacy of this impact—called 
“simulation theory” in philosophy of mind—in contrast to “theory theory,” which 
requires cognitive introspection before engaged empathetic response—no doubt 
inspired Plato’s concerns about the contagion of behavior spreading from the 
stage to the audience. In fact, most theorists engaged in this debate accept a hybrid 
version of the two theories, with some leaning more to one side than the other, but 
both recognize the initiating effects of simulation.37 It is also found in Aristotle’s 
distinction, in Chapter 14 of the Poetics, between the immediate, kinesthetically 
mimetic effects of theatrical spectacle on audience emotion, which he downgrades 
to the merely “sensational,” as opposed to the deeper emotion of fear that is properly 
an effect of understanding the trajectory of the plot.38 This simulative mirroring 
process forms the condition of possibility for recognition, but it requires something 
more (according to Aristotle, something discursive) to trigger a power inducing a 
deeper emotional self-awareness. 
I always find myself returning to Freud in the railway carriage, mistaking his 
reflection for that of another old man, and then realizing it is he himself. What he 
then called “the uncanny” is not the original perception of the strange old man, 
but the frisson between that stranger and the person Freud knew himself to be, 
between what Sartre called the object and the image. As Paul Ricoeur referred to 
it in a very different context, it is “oneself as another.”39 The problem as it exists 
for spectatorial self-reflection based on a mimetic relation to stage actions has to 
do with overcoming one’s habitual self-image in order to see oneself as others 
might see one. 
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None of what I have said about what I think are Diamond’s mistaken 
assumptions about mimesis should be taken to disparage the importance of 
her aims to see that women critically confront the way their social and cultural 
representations have served historically to diminish, marginalize, or oppress them, or 
to see that dramatic means be found to reverse this tendency and empower women 
in their various means of self-representation. In fact, her approach in Unmaking 
Mimesis to how this is done, from the plays of Aphra Behn, to Elizabeth Robins’s 
performances of Ibsen, to East Village lesbian performance, can constitute strategies 
for confronting this issue and triggering recognition. But the specific theoretical 
way she founds these strategies in an essentialization and presumed subversion of 
the Platonic as the universally accepted definition of mimesis is mistaken. There 
is no question that specific, oppressive kinds of representation can be altered and 
turned back upon themselves; that, as she so ably demonstrates in her chapter on 
Ibsen, even the historical moment of depicting middle class women as “hysterical” 
can be rewritten or replayed so as to turn the apparently symptomatic to real critical 
advantage in a political sense. But, as I’ve said, all of these are specific uses of 
mimesis that serve a different intent and aim than the socially hegemonic uses put to 
them. Hopefully, different understandings that challenge such historically dominant 
uses can also be accomplished by mimetic means, rather than attempting a futile 
undermining of mimesis itself as some essential category of the determination of 
being. And it is precisely because mimesis eludes anyone’s complete control, even 
in terms of self-representation, that its variety of uses, socially critical but also 
self-revealing or self-illuminating, are possible. 
The point behind both the story of the miming game with my infant daughter 
and the sometimes uncanny nature in which mirrors reflect back what we don’t 
quite recognize, or are afraid to recognize, is that mimesis, no matter with what 
exactitude we prepare it for the sake of a specific communicative or demonstrative 
aim can always provoke a quite different interpretation than what we expect or 
desire. However satisfied we may be about how we theorize our intentions, it won’t 
guarantee the expected reception. This forms part of the learning process for the 
theatrical artist as much as it does for the audience. Diamond is right to pay attention 
to Plato’s anxiety about the lack of control over what he thinks are its proper uses 
and modes of reception—which are clearly sexist in nature. But her assumptions 
about the “saming” power of mimesis itself and her confident belief that mimétisme 
can itself be adequately controlled to undermine this power and establish its own 
form of proper reception belies that very understanding of the lability of mimesis 
as it is. In fact, the more complex the intended reception, the less likely one will 
be satisfied with what actually occurs.40 With mimesis (plus poeisis) our desires 
can be given free rein, but we can only do the best we can with what is available 
to us. Any measure of communicative success requires a measure of credibility, 
of plausibility—about both present conditions and any possible alternatives—for 
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the aims of audience recognition and acceptance of the believability of the staged 
scenario, before any critical work can be accomplished. And we should leave open 
the possibility that the result might be something quite different than we expected 
it to be. Such are the risks and value of mimesis in its variety of uses. 
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